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THE "CORPORATE WILL" OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY
By Elisabeth Zoller*
In contrast to the withholding practices of certain member states in respect
of part of their assessed contributions to the budget of the United Nations,
United States withholding began rather recently. U.S. withholding started
in 1980 and, until 1985, applied only to specific programs and decisions.'
Previously, in 1978, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State had con-
cluded in a memorandum of law that Article 17 of the UN Charter "impose[s]
a legal obligation on members to pay the amount assessed to them by the
General Assembly." 2 Referring to the U.S. written statement submitted to
the International Court of Justice in Certain Expenses of the Uni!ed Nations,'
he added: "Accordingly, the General Assembly's adoption and apportion-
ment of the Organization's expenses create a binding international legal
obligation on the part of State Members to pay their assessed shares." 4 In
his view, there was apparently no possible exception to this obligation.
These legal qualms have seemingly disappeared in the 1980s, as the United
States has embraced, on various legal grounds, a withholding policy that
culminated in 1985 with the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment. ' In 1982
President Reagan announced that the United States would not pay its assessed
share of the expenses of the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission. 6 In
1983 Congress mandated a 25 percent withholding of the U.S. assessed
contributions for programs involving the Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Special Unit on Pales-
tinian Rights, and for projects that would benefit the Palestine Liberation
Organization or the South West Africa People's Organization. 7 In 1985, a
similar 25 percent withholding was enacted regarding the Second Decade
* Professeur Agr(g6 des Facults de Droit; Professor of Law, Rutgers University-Camden.
'See C.-A. Fleischhauer, paper presented at the meeting held by the American Society of
International Law on the UN financial crisis, infra note 15, para. 3 (June 12, 1986).
2 Hansell, Memorandum of Aug. 7, 1978, 1979 DIGEST OF UNITED STATIZ PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW [hereinafter 1979 U.S. DIGEST] 225, 226.
s U.S. Written Statement, 1962 ICJ Pleadings (Certain Expenses of the United Nations) 180,
193 (February 1962).
4 Hansell, supra note 2, at 226 (quoting U.S. Statement, id.).
22 U.S.C. §287e note (Supp. III 1985).
'Statement of President Ronald W. Reagan, Dec. 30, 1982, [1982] 2 PUB. PAPERS 1652,
reprinted in U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. USUN 1-(83),Jan. 3, 1983.
See Note, United Nations Financing of the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission: May the United
States Withhold Payment?, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 472, 473 nn.5 and 6 (1985).
7 Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, §114(a), Pub. L. No.
98-164,97 Stat. 1017, 1020 (approved Nov. 22, 1983) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §287e note (Supp.
III 1985)).
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to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, the possible implementation
of General Assembly Resolution "33/79" (sic)8 and the construction of the
headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.9 Finally, also in 1985, Congress adopted the Kassebaum-Solomon
amendment,'" which cuts by 20 percent for 1987 and following years pay-
ment by the United States of its assessed contribution to the regular budget
of the United Nations" until the Organization and its specialized agencies
' Such is the reference in Statutes at Large, infra note 9, and in the United States Code as well
(22 U.S.C. §287e note). Presumably, Congress meant Resolution 3379 (XXX) of Nov. 10,
1975, determining "that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination," 30 UN GAOR
Supp. (No. 34) at 83, 84, UN Doc. A/10034 (1975), and not Resolution 33/79 on Revision
of the lists of States eligible for membership in the Industrial Development Board, 33 UN
GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 83, UN Doc. A/33/45 (1978).
' Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, § 144, Pub. L. No. 99-
93, 99 Stat. 405, 424-25 (approved Aug. 16, 1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §287e note (Supp.
III 1985)).
11d. § 143, 99 Stat. at 424 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §287e note (Supp. III 1985)). It took 2
years for the Kassebaum initiative to become law. Its original version (see The U.S. Role in the
United Nations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations of
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 House
Hearings]) provided that U.S. assessed payments to the United Nations, UNESCO, the WHO,
the FAO and the ILO for 1984
shall not exceed its assessed payments to each such organization for the calendar year
1980. Such payments to each such organization for the calendar years 1985, 1986, and
1987 shall be no more than 90 per centum, 80 per centum, and 70 per centum, respectively,
of the amount of the assessments paid to each such organization for the calendar year
1980.
The original version further provided that payments to those organizations for the calendar
years 1985, 1986, and 1987 would be withheld unless the specified reductions were "accepted
by the respective organization as payment in full of the United States assessment towards the
financial support of such organization."
In 1985 congressional political support for the United Nations foundered. On May 8, Con-
gressmanJerry Solomon proposed a floor amendment aimed at cutting at least 15% of the U.S.
assessment for FY 1987. See 131 CONG. REC. H2995 (daily ed. May 8, 1985). The amendment
was agreed to without a vote (id. at H2997), "with only the briefest reference as to the legal
implications," as Margaret E. Galey rightly noted (see Galey, Statement of June 12, 1986, in
Financial Crisis at the United Nations, infra note 15). On the Senate side, Senator Kassebaum
offered a new version of her initiative on June 7, 1985 that tied U.S. projected withholding to
reform of budget procedures. 131 CONG. REC. S7793 (daily ed. June 7, 1985). On a roll-call
vote, the amendment was adopted by 71 to 13, with 16 not voting. Id. at 57796. The issue of
U.S. treaty commitments was raised but not solved, and Senator Pell summarized the problem
well when he said:
This is the fourth time that such a floor amendment has been introduced reducing funding
for the United Nations and affiliated organizations. I think many of us share the concerns,
and are very upset and angered with the way we get kicked around in the United Nations
and the problems we have there. But this is not the way to seek to resolve it in my view.
I think it would have serious foreign policy implications. It is a matter that never has been
considered in any depth by the Foreign Relations Committee, and it should.
Id. at S7794-95.
I Technically, the amendment limits U.S. contributions to 20% of the budgets of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies; coincidentally, this amounts to a 20% cut in the UN regular
budget.
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grant to each member state voting rights proportionate to their contributions
to their respective budgets. The impact of the Kassebaum amendment on
the finances of the United Nations is considerable not only because the
United States contributes 25 percent of the total UN budget, but also because
of the additional impact of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,' 2 which for
fiscal year 1986 mandated a 4.3 percent sequestration of almost all federal
appropriations, including those for international organizations. Moreover,
the Sundquist amendment, which was also adopted in 1985,"' imposes a
reduction in payment of the U.S. assessment corresponding to the U.S. share
of the salaries of UN employees who are compelled to return a portion of
their wages to their governments.
It is certainly not the first time that a member state of the United Nations
has withheld part of its contribution to the budget. 4 However, previous
withholdings were mostly applied to special activities (viz., peacekeeping
operations). The Kassebaum amendment marks the first time that a member
state has withheld such a massive portion of its assessed contribution across
the board (with the exception of South Africa, which has not paid its con-
tribution since it was expelled from the General Assembly in 1974). As a
result, the U.S. withholdings have been the subject of extensive legal analysis,
especially in the larger context of the overall financial obligations of member
states.' 5 Despite their varying views, foreign-policy makers, UN officials and
international scholars do concur in recognizing that in withholding its as-
2 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1037 (codified principally at 2 U.S.C. §901 (Supp. III 1985)), popularly known as the
"Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act," which is intended to eliminate the federal budget deficit by
setting a maximum deficit amount for federal spending for each of the fiscal years 1986 through
1991 (progressively reducing the deficit amount to zero in 1991). The ruling or the Supreme
Court in Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.Ct. 318 (1986), had no impact on the appropriations for
international organizations, which under the legislation are subject to a 4.3% sequestration for
FY 1986. "The United Nations is not immune from these austerities." See Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1987: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 953 (1986) (Statement of
Alan L. Keyes, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs). See also
Impact of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings on U.S. Contributions to International Organizations: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations and the Subcomm. on International
Operations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-57 (1986).
" Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, §151, Pub. L. No. 99-
93, 99 Stat. 405, 428 (approved Aug. 16, 1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §287e note (Supp. III
1985)).
14 See H. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAw 494-95, §883 (1980).
"5 In 1986 the American Society of International Law sponsored several meetings on the
financial crisis at the United Nations. The proceedings are briefly summarized in ASIL NEws-
LETTER, May-July 1986, at 1-3, and reprinted in Financial Crisis at the United Nations: Inter-
national Law and United States Withholding of Payments to International Organizations (mimeo
1986). See also HERITAGE FOUNDATION, BACKGROUNDER, No. 536, Sept. 26, 1986 (on its
United Nations Assessment Project Study, "The Legal Case for Cutting U.S. Funding for the
United Nations"); Nelson, International Law and U.S. Withholding of Payments ts International
Organizations, 80 AJIL 973 (1986). The author would like to thank Paul C. Szasz for the outline
of Legal Aspects of U.S. Non-Payment of Assessed Contributions to the UN, a talk delivered
to Prof. George Sherry's seminar (Oct. 7, 1986).
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sessed contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations, the United
States is not complying with what would ordinarily be an international ob-
ligation. The differences of opinion focus on whether there are grounds
that vitiate the obligation. This "unsettled issue," as Oscar Schachter has
observed, "is still the question that was in the forefront of the San Francisco
debates in 1945: to what extent will the Member States, especially those
with great resources and military strength, be required to comply with the
'corporate will' of the organization as determined by a majority?" 16 The
purpose of this essay is to try to shed some light on this issue, which remains
a matter of uncertainty 7 and dispute.'
To some extent, the controversy is rooted in a complex argument over
the meaning of the International Court's Certain Expenses opinion, which
never actually addressed whether withholdings are legitimate responses to
alleged illegitimate expenses." The 1962 advisory opinion is unequivocally
conclusive on the obligation to contribute to legal expenditures, i.e., expenses
of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the
Charter, but rather ambiguous on the obligation to contribute to unlawful
expenditures and, in particular, to an assessment to defray the cost of what
is asserted to be an ultra vires act. At its boldest, the Court merely stated,
with regard to an "action. . .by the wrong organ," that "this would not
6 Schachter, Legal Problems, 1963-1964 ANN. REV. UN AFF. 118, 121-22.
'7 As Henry G. Schermers put it: "It is difficult to establish an obligation to contribute to
illegal expenditure. It is equally hard to accept that each State may subjectively decide what
will constitute illegal expenditure." H. SCHERMERS, supra note 14, at 495, §884.
" See, e.g., ASIL NEWSLErER, May-July 1986, at 1-3 (various views expressed at meetings
of June 12 and 20). U.S. foreign-policy makers are embarrassed and perhaps confused about
the legality of withholdings from the regular UN budget. See statement of Senator Pell, supra
note 10. Margaret E. Galey hinted that during the course of the past few years, the administration
has deliberately let confusion grow in Congress:
In the past the Administration used to come up to the Hill and- fight amendments that
would violate our legal obligations to the UN. They would work very hard, they would
have teams of people up here working to put such amendments down, but we haven't
seen that lately. In the last year the Administration has given us no clear signal as to
whether they oppose, fundamentally, these amendments.
See Galey, Statement of June 12, 1986, supra note 10.
"9 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 1962
ICJ REP. 151 (Advisory Opinion of July 20) [hereinafter Certain Expenses]. The Court clearly
framed the scope of the question put to it, as follows:
Although the Court will examine Article 17 in itself and in its relation to the rest of
the Charter, it should be noted that at least three separate questions might arise in the
interpretation of paragraph 2 of this Article. One question is that of identifying what are
"the expenses of the Organization"; a second question might concern apportionment by
the General Assembly; while a third question might involve the interpretation of the
phrase "shall be borne by the Members". It is the second and third questions which
directly involve "the financial obligations of the Members", but it is only thefirst question
which is posed by the request for the advisory opinion. The question put to the Court has to do
with a moment logically anterior to apportionment, just as a question of apportionment
would be anterior to a question of Members' obligation to pay.
Id. at 157-58 (emphasis added).
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necessarily mean that the expense incurred [is] not an expense of the Or-
ganization."20
There is thus a need to go beyond the 1962 opinion and specifically to
examine whether the law of treaties as codified in the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention-which applies to the Charter21-does or does not permit with-
holding of contributions. It is appropriate to begin with a legal definition of
"withholding." Withholding is a refusal to pay. In legal terms, however,
withholding is a unilateral suspension of an obligation embodied in a mul-
tilateral treaty. Whenever a member state of the United Nations withholds
its assessed contribution (in whole or in part) to the regular budget of the
Organization, it departs from the principle of collective financial responsi-
bility embodied in Article 17(2) of the Charter: "The expenses of the Or-
ganization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General
Assembly." A withholding state acts as if there were some reason for it not
to comply with the obligation to pay its assessed contribution. Treaty law
provides many possibilities for a suspension of a treaty obligation to be le-
gitimate beyond any shadow of a doubt.22 The core of the problem is to
discover whether withholding may be one of them.
This methodological starting point will be the unifying thread of this
essay. Part I will discuss whether withholding may bejustified on the ground
of a tolerance progressively developed over the years by the Organization.
As no established practice can be proved in that respect, we will address in
part II whether withholding is a legitimate response to breaches of the
Charter. After reaching a negative conclusion, we will try to demonstrate
in part III that withholding cannot even be justified by reference to the
theory of fundamental change of circumstances. Finally, in part IV we look
beyond the law of treaties and suggest possible ways of construing the alleged
absolute obligation to pay so as to protect the rights of the minority against
the tyranny of the majority.
I. WITHHOLDING BASED ON TOLERANCE DEVELOPED OVER TIME
The belief that withholding is consistent with the practice of other nations
has been generally accepted by foreign-policy makers. The alleged failure
of the United Nations to enforce Article 19 of the Charter (loss of voting
rights) against withholders is often viewed as having established over the
years a tolerance for breaches of Article 17(2). Continuous unpunished re-
fusals to pay are purported to have set, as the U.S. Comptroller contended,
20 d. at 168.
21 Article 5 of the Vienna Convention provides: "The present Convention applies to any
treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization. . . without prejudice
to any relevant rules of the organization." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened
for signature May 23, 1969, UNTS Regis. No. 18,232, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted
in 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679 (1969).22 See E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES
28-31 (1984) [hereinafter COUNTERMEASURES], and ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH U.S. LEGISLATION 23-30 (1985).
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"a new pattern for the membership, some of whom withhold assessments
each year for items to which they object."2 3 On October 3, 1983, Ambassador
JeaneJ. Kirkpatrick reminded congressmen that "30 countries withhold, as
a matter of announced policy, portions of their assessed budgets and incur
no penalties."2" Two years later, she stated: "Selective withholding is . . .
consistent with the practice of other nations."25 The same argument was also
made implicitly by Congressman Solomon in defending his amendment be-
fore the House:
Over the years at least 30 countries have withheld funds from the
United Nations. The list includes most of the countries in the Soviet
bloc as well as a number of others, including France, Portugal, Algeria,
India, and even Saudi Arabia.. . . [T]he question is: Have any of these
countries lost their voting rights? The answer is "No." 2
On its face, the argument is appealing. Tolerance of continuous and re-
peated disregard for a key provision in the enforcement of member states'
financial obligations could pave the way to a waiver of these obligations.2"
A treaty obligation whose violation is never punished may lose its effectiveness
and perhaps fall into desuetude, 28 or at least lead to a situation tantamount
to a fundamental change of circumstances.29 With respect to the constituent
instruments of international organizations, Henry G. Schermers has even
expressed the following view:
When a rule has been violated and the organization has tolerated
the violation, it may have created the expectation that further similar
violations will be tolerated as well. After some time and after many
tolerated violations such expectation may become legitimate and the
organization will have to tolerate similar violations by other Members
unless it can demonstrate why it should not treat all Members equally.
In fact the toleration of too many violations may lead to a tacit revision
of the constitution."0
As far as Article 19 of the Charter is concerned, Thomas M. Franck has
traveled quite far along the same path. He sees the great crisis in the General
Assembly, particularly during the 19th session, as strongly suggesting that
23 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ACTIONS RECOMMENDED
TO ALLEVIATE SERIOUS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS FACING UNITED NATIONS 11 (1976) (emphasis
added).
24 1983 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 54 (emphasis added).
5U.S. Policy in the United Nations: Hearings and Markup Before the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs and its Subcomms. on Human Rights and International Organizations, and on International
Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1985 House Hearings].
26 131 CONG. REc. H2813 (daily ed. May 2, 1985). In fairness, the only reason why these
countries have not lost their vote is that their cumulative withholdings have not been sufficient
for the Article 19 penalty to be applied.
27 See H. SCHERMERS, supra note 14, at 88, § 133.
2 8 See C. DE VISSCHER, LES EFFECTIVITP-S DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 74 (1967); 1 C.
RoussEAu, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 217-18, para. 193 (1970).
2 See Brierly, Some Considerations on the Obsolescence of Treaties, 11 GROTIUS Soc'Y TRANS-
ACTIONS 11-20, especially at 15 (1925); and infra pt. III.
" H. SCHERMERS, supra note 14, at 88, § 133 (footnotes omitted).
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"the theoretical 'obligation to pay' died on the floor of the Assembly in
1965."'" The thrust of his argument is that financial obligations under the
Charter have been so seriously impaired from 1965 on, that the daunting
problem arises as to whether "the norm fell into desuetude."3 2 Although
one may hesitate in this case to allude to desuetude since the Vienna Con-
vention did not codify this ground for terminating treaty obligations, the
practice of the Organization in the enforcement of Article 19 has certainly
called into question the effectiveness of the financial provisions of the Charter.
Admittedly controversial, enforcement of Article 19 raises two intertwined
problems: (1) have member states won the right not to pay?3 and (2) has
the Organization lost its right to be paid?
The all-too-common belief that practice may have modified the obligation
to pay set forth in Article 17(2) of the Charter cannot be justified under
present-day international law; a treaty may not be modified by subsequent
practice in applying the treaty, even if that practice should establish the
agreement of the parties to modify the provisions of the treaty. Provision
for such modification was made in the International Law Commission's text
of 1966"4 but expressly rejected by the Vienna Conference by 53 votes
(including that of the United States) to 15, with 26 abstentions. 35 Subsequent
practice in applying a treaty may only be "taken into account" when inter-
preting the treaty (Article 31 (3)(b) of the Vienna Convention). As a result,
the practice of some members regarding their financial obligations far from
confers a right on other members not to pay. As a matter of law, to infer
the existence of such a right is out of the question, for it would necessitate
a modification, i.e., a revision, of the Charter. Interpretation of a treaty is
one thing; its revision is another.3 6 In short, member states are still legally
bound to pay their assessed contributions.
The real question is whether a member state is entitled "to take into
account" the practice of other members when fulfilling its own financial
obligations. Such entitlement is doubtful because subsequent practice may
be taken into account only if it establishes "the agreement of the parties"
regarding interpretation of the treaty. Common sense compels one to rec-
ognize that UN members have never agreed on the exact scope of their
financial obligations. True, the so-called Goldberg reservation retained the
right for the United States to withhold assessments "if. . .strorg and com-
3 1 T. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION-WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U.N. DREAM AND
WHAT THE U.S. CAN Do ABOUT IT 259 (1985).
32 Id.
" See, in particular, the cautious, but suggestive, reference made by Thomas M. Franck, id.
at 86, to the possibility that in 1965 the Soviet Union may have won "an effective 'right' not to
pay" (emphasis added).
s' Art. 38, Draft articles on the law of treaties adopted by the International Law Commission
at its eighteenth session, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 177, 182, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1966/Add.1, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, OFFICIAL
RECORDS, DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE, 7, 55, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/1 I/Add.2 (1971)
[hereinafter VIENNA DOCUMENTS].
" See VIENNA DOCUMENTS, supra note 34, at 158.
16 The distinction was made by the International Court ofJustice in Interpretation of Peace
Treaties (second phase), 1950 ICJ REP. 221, 229 (Advisory Opinion ofJuly 18)
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pelling reasons exist for doing so.''17 But Ambassador Goldberg never ap-
proved the withholdings of other members; he never acquiesced in exceptions
to the principle of collective financial responsibility; he merely reserved U.S.
rights. On the whole, the United States has never ceased to support a rather
strict interpretation of UN financial obligations.3" U.S. disapproval of other
members' arguments and withholdings has therefore prevented unpunished
violations of the obligation to pay from achieving accepted status and from
constituting subsequent practice in the application of the treaty.
It could be argued that the United States eventually expressed agreement
with other member states by instituting a withholding policy in 1980. This
is also doubtful because the United States has not grounded its withholdings
on the practice of other members and its alleged tolerance by the Organi-
zation. In fact, even in the absence of any withholding by UN members
since 1945, the United States presumably would have refused to pay for
possible implementation of Resolution 3379 (XXX), which stated "that
zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."
In any event, even if we suppose that the United States finally agreed
with other members on a common interpretation of UN financial obligations,
still some U.S. withholdings have not received the assent either of other
members or, indeed, of another withholder (France). On March 14, 1986,
the members of the European Community addressed a memorandum to
Secretary of State Shultz conveying their concern over "the United States
not fully meeting its financial obligation to the United Nations as contained
in Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter."39 When withholders do not
even agree among themselves, lack of agreement more nearly resembles
total confusion. As a result, the so-called practice of withholding has never
become a legally meaningful subsequent practice in the interpretation of
the Charter and unpunished withholdings are not accepted as law. The
"practice" of withholding has never ceased to be what it was from the be-
ginning: a sequence of departures from the Charter. This pattern of conduct
has no legal force, value or status. A right to withhold cannot be based upon
such shaky practice.
Absent a legally relevant practice of the parties, one may turn to the
practice of the Organization itself and inquire whether it has lost its right
17 See UN Doc. A/AC.12 I/PV. 15, at 8-10 (1965), reprinted in 60 AJIL 106 (1966). See also
UN Doc. A/5916/Add.I (1965), 19 UN GAOR Annex 21, at 86.
" See, e.g., the oral statement of Abram Chayes in 1962 ICJ Pleadings (Certain Expenses of
the United Nations) 414: "If the Assembly has power under Article 17 to impose binding
financial obligations for all expenditures lawfully incurred," he said, "and if it is granted that
the Assembly intended to exercise that power, then the only argument that remains against
the binding character of the assessments is that they were not levied to cover expenditures
laufullv incurred" (emphasis in the text); or id. at 424: "[T]he distinction between administrative
and operational expenses. . . is unwarranted in the language or history of the Charter and
would be unworkable in practice." See also the Department of State reference aid of January
1979, 1979 U.S. DIGEST, supra note 2, at 229: "The treaties make clear that each nation is
obligated to make its payments in the entire amount of the assessments finally decided upon
and without placing conditions on the use of that money."
"9 See 25 ILM 482 (1986).
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to be paid because of failure to enforce Article 19. The position of the
Organization is that enforcement of Article 19 against members objecting
to activities funded by voluntary contributions (viz., certain peacekeeping
operations) must be left aside because in such cases there is no obligation to
pay and no right to be paid.4" Leaving thus aside the case of special accounts,
the Organization maintains that Article 19 is always strictly enforced against
member states that are in arrears with respect to the regular budget.4 The
Legal Counsel of the United Nations on two different occasions42 defined
the legal position of the Organization on Article 19. The Soviet Union main-
tained that the article does not imply an automatic loss of vote, which should
be subject to a decision of the General Assembly made by a two-thirds ma-
jority as with decisions on the suspension of the rights and privileges of
membership (Article 18(2) of the Charter). The Legal Counsel squarely
dismissed the Soviet Union's claim on the ground that the loss of the vote
is "a mandatory penalty" that the General Assembly may not lift or waive
at its discretion except in a specifically defined circumstance, i.e., if it is
satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the member's
control.4" Moreover, the Legal Counsel emphasized that the effect of Article
19 is automatic.44 Indeed, the practice during all votes (e.g., roll call, show
of hands, recorded or nonrecorded electronic votes, secret ballots) is not to
call out the name of any defaulting member state that meets the terms of
Article 19. Except for the Soviet Union,45 no member state has ever entered
a formal protest against this established practice of the Organization, which
is carried out if necessary at each session of the General Assembly.46
Whereas the Organization takes advantage of the black-letter law, U.S.
foreign-policy makers and international legal scholars invoke its spirit instead.
They argue that neither the distinction between the regular budget and
40 It must be borne in mind that Article 19 does not come into play with respect to the
totality of the expenses of the Organization, and in particular the expense of certain peacekeeping
operations since some of these expenses were separated from the normal budget of the Or-
ganization. Today, however, only UNFICYP is funded voluntarily. UNDOF and UNIFIL (and
formerly UNEF II) are funded by assessed contributions under Article 17(2) of' the Charter,
though according to a different scale of assessment from that for the regular budget. See U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9507, THIRTY-FOURTH REPORT TO THE CONGRES ON UNITED
STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (F.Y. 1985), at 12-13, 16-17
(1986).
41 See REPERTORY OF PRAcTICE OF UNITED -NATIONS ORGANS Supp. (No. 4), vol. 1 at 232-
33, paras. 5-12 (UN Pub. No. E.80.V.13, 1982). See also Ciobanu, Financial Obligations of
States under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, 5 QUADERNI DELLA RIVISTA DI DIRIrrO INTER-
NAZIONALE 47-75 (1973).
42 1968 UNJURID. Y.B. 186; 1974 id. at 156.
43 1968 UNJURID. Y.B. at 187, para. 6.
41Id., para. 10; 1974 UNJURID. Y.B. at 156, para. 1.
41See UN Doc. A/7237 (1968), 23 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10A) at 6, UN Dac. A/7210/
Add.1 (1969); UN Doc. A/C.5/33/SR.4-6, 8 and 10 (1978).
46 See, e.g., for the 23d session of the General Assembly: UN Doc. A/7237, supra note 45;
for the 28th session, UN Docs. A/9157 and Adds. 1-2, A/PV.2117 and A/PV.2131, paras.
68-70 (1973); for the 6th Special Session, UN Docs. A/9547 and A/PV.2207 (1974); for the
31st session, UN Docs. A/31/219 and A/31/PV.1, paras. 41-43 (1976); and for the 32d
session, UN Docs. A/32/PV.1, paras. 16-18, and A/32/224/Add.1 (1977).
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special accounts, nor the difference between regular expenses and other
expenses is legally meaningful since both were formally rejected by the In-
ternational Court ofJustice in the Certain Expenses opinion.4 7 The American
approach to collective financial responsibility is that this principle was meant
to be and should have remained indivisible. From this point of view, Article
19 obviously is not being fully enforced.
The positions of the Organization and the United States are irreconcilable,
but, fortunately enough, there is no need to bring them into agreement.
Our sole concern is to find out whether the Organization could have lost its
right to be paid, i.e., whether this right may be considered to have fallen
into desuetude following the ineffective enforcement of Article 19. Such an
argument is legally untenable because, first, even if we assume that Article
19 has been improperly enforced, i.e., if the view most favorable to the
American arguments is adopted,4" it is impossible to pretend that Article
19 is not being enforced at all. And without a complete absence of enforce-
ment, possibly buttressed by contrary usage, desuetude cannot operate.
Moreover, desuetude is not recognized as a legal basis for the extinction of
treaties; "while . . .desuetude may be a factual cause of the termination
of a treaty, the legal basis of such termination, where it occurs, is the consent
of the parties to abandon the treaty."4 9 A treaty provision cannot fall into de-
suetude merely by virtue of incomplete enforcement. Unsatisfactory or in-
sufficient enforcement of treaty provisions can only be encompassed by a
fundamental change of circumstances in the application of the treaty, which
applies as "a 'residual' ground of termination""0 whenever there appears to
be no other ground recognized by international law for terminating the
treaty.
Second, the Organization could not have lost its right to be paid unless
the General Assembly had unequivocally waived the financial obligations of
the Soviet Union, France and several other states that refused to pay their
share for UN peacekeeping activities. But the obligations of these states have
never been explicitly "dispensed" with or "suspended," which is significant
because both the "dispensing" and the "suspending" powers of international
organizations are subject to specific procedures that always imply prior or
subsequent approval.5 It would be far-fetched to suppose that subjects of
international law could lose attributes of their international personality
through presumption.
Third, if the Organization had lost its right to be paid, member states
would have won a right not to pay, for a creditor's right to be paid entails
47 1962 ICJ REP. at 159 and 161.
48 For a French view, see Schricke, Article 19, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES 399, 405
(J. P. Cot & A. Pellet eds. 1985).
"' Draft articles, supra note 34, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 237 (emphasis added).
50 A. VAMVOUKOS, TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE DOCTRINES
OF REBUS sic STANTIBUS AND DESUETUDE 204 (1985). See also infra pt. III.
51 See J. GOLD, The "Dispensing" and "Suspending" Powers of International Organizations, 19
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 169, 189 (1972), reprinted in LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS 352, 375 (1979).
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as a necessary corollary a debtor's obligation to pay. We have already dem-
onstrated, however, that member states cannot purport to have gained a
right not to pay.
In sum, no established practice can be considered as having resulted in a
waiver of the obligation to pay. Therefore, the withholding of contributions
to the budget of the United Nations finds no sound legal basis in an alleged
tolerance that has never achieved legal status.
II. WITHHOLDING AS A RESPONSE TO BREACHES OF THE CHARTER
States generally attribute their refusals to pay their UN assessments to
alleged violations of the Charter. Such was the case when several states,
including the Soviet Union and France, denied that they were obliged to
pay for the expenses, e.g., of the United Nations Operation in the Congo
(ONUC)5 . or the UN Memorial Cemetery in Korea.5" The United States
did not stray from this legal reasoning when it explained its refusal to con-
tribute to the expenses of the Law of the Sea Preparatory Commission by
asserting that the Commission was "not a subsidiary organ of the UN" and
"not answerable to the United Nations." 54 Even the Kassebaum-Solomon
amendment, which on its face is not a response to breaches of the UN
Charter, was presented on one occasion as a response to various breaches
deriving from "a perversion of the ideals found in the U.N. Charter."
'55
Violations of the Charter 56 certainly are among the "compelling reasons"
invoked by Ambassador Goldberg5 7 as grounds that would permit the United
States to depart from the principle of collective financial responsibility. Pos-
sible responses to breaches of multilateral treaties are contemplated in Article
60(2) of the Vienna Convention, which the Court considered "a codification
of existing customary law on the subject." 5 Article 60(2) reads as follows:
A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the op-
eration of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either:
(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State,
or
(ii) as between all the parties;
52 See L. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 799-807 (1967).
5 See Financial problems of the United Nations, 1975 UN Y.B. 953.
54 See Statement of President Reagan, supra note 6.
55 See Statement of Senator Ford, 131 CONG. REC. S7794 (daily ed. June 7, 1985).
See, e.g., for alleged departures from the law of the United Nations endorsed by the
Secretariat, T. MERON, THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT 77 (1977); and by the General
Assembly, Gross, On the Degradation of the Constitutional Environment of the United Nations, 77
AJIL 569 (1983).
17 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
" Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ REP.
16, 47, para. 94 (Advisory Opinion ofJune 21) [hereinafter Namibia].
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(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground
for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the
relations between itself and the defaulting State;
(c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach
as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in
part with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a
material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the
position of every party with respect to the further performance of its
obligations under the treaty. 9
First, it must be borne in mind that Article 60(2) is "without prejudice
to any provision in the treaty applicable in the event of a breach." This
caveat merely reserves the rights of the parties under any specific provisions
applicable if there is a breach.6" Before being "reserved," however, such
rights must exist. With respect to the case at hand, the Charter provides for
remedies whenever members do not comply with their financial obligations:
the General Assembly must deprive delinquent debtors of their voting rights
in its sessions. It could therefore be argued that the financial obligations of
member states constitute a "self-contained r~gime"' that precludes paid-
up member states from taking unilateral steps against those in default. But
this argument is weak, because to bar states from taking the law into their
own hands, a self-contained regime must be "entirely efficacious, "62 a con-
dition that obviously has not been fulfilled with respect to the enforcement
of Article 19 over the years.
Second, Article 60(2) addresses a "material breach" of the treaty. This
language implies that the operation of the treaty can only be suspended in
part in the two cases provided for in Article 60(3), i.e., when there is "(a) a
repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or (b)
the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
purpose of the treaty."
With regard to alleged violations of the UN Charter, the authority of
member states to qualify the breach raises an intricate procedural problem:
to what extent do member states of the United Nations have discretion to
claim that their interpretation of the Charter is the correct one? True, in
general international law, "each State establishes for itself its legal situation
vis-a-vis other States."6 3 This principle was upheld in both the Lac Lanoux6 4
and the Air Service Agreement arbitrations.6 5 However, in the latter decision
Art. 60(2), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21.
0 Draft articles, supra note 34, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 255, para. 10.
"' United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ REP. 3,
40, para. 86 (Judgment of May 24). See also E. ZOLLER, COUNTERMEASURES, supra note 22, at
92; Simma, Self-Contained Rigimes, 26 NErH. Y.B. INT'L L. 111 (1985).
62 1980 ICJ REP. at 40, para. 86.
6 Case concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States
of America and France, 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 417, 443, para. 81 (1978) [hereinafter Air
Service Agreement].
64 Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain/Fr.), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 285, 310, para. 16 (1957).
6 Air Service Agreement, supra note 63, 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 443, para. 81.
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in particular, the tribunal made very clear that the rigbt of auto-
interpretation 66 existed "unless the contrary results from special obligations
arising under particular treaties, notably from mechanisms created within
the framework of international organisations. ' 67 This caveat makes sense
for international organizations, such as the European Communities, whose
constituent instruments vestjurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of the
treaty in an impartial third body.68 Under the law of the United Nations,
however, things are very different. The International Court of Justice has
no compulsory jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of the Charter. It
may only be requested to interpret it, but in any event its own interpretation
will be no more than an advisory opinion. Furthermore, "[t]he Organization
is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members" (Article
2(1) of the Charter) and the right of auto-interpretation is the quintessence
of sovereignty. Under these circumstances, Dan Ciobanu is right in pointing
out that
dissenting Member States may claim that their interpretation of the
Charter (and generally of the law of the United Nations) is the correct
one, and decline to comply with decisions made by the political organs
on the basis of their own interpretation of the Charter. . . States
possess, under the law of the United Nations as it stands at present,
the so-called "right of last resort."69
It is thus doubtful that persuasive and conclusive arguments can be made
on the "material" or "nonmaterial" character of the violations invoked by
members for refusing to pay. This problem is less serious than it seems
because the crux of the matter considered here is not the merits of the claim
but the procedures available to enforce it.
It is a commonplace, at least in the United States, that withholding is a
legitimate response to the numerous and continuous refusals to pay by those
members that object to certain activities of the Organization. It is claimed
that a member is entitled to withhold whenever other members do not pay
and are not punished. Viewed in light of Article 60(2), this kind of justifi-
cation opens two possibilities. On the one hand, if unpunished refusals to
pay are looked upon as "nonmaterial breaches," they fall outside the scope
of Article 60(2) and inside a classic mechanism of international responsibility.
Within this mechanism, a contracting party may suspend the operation of a
treaty provision of equal value or equal meaning (inadimplenti non est adim-
plendum), but only insofar as (1) that party is directly injured by the violation,
and (2) the effects of the suspension are limited to that party's relation with
the defaulting party.7" None of these conditions are met when a member
66 See L. GROSS, States as Organs of International Law and the Problem ofAutointerpretation, in
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 59 (G. A. Lipsky ed. 1953), reprinted in 1
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 367 (1984).
17 Air Service Agreement, supra note 63, 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 443, para. 81.61 See, e.g., Arts. 164-188, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1,
1958, 298 UNTS 11.
69 
D. CIOBANU, PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS RELATED TO THEJURISDICTION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS POLITICAL ORGANS 174 (1975).70 See P. REUTER, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT DES TRAITfS 160, para. 283 (1985).
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state withholds in response to the refusals to pay of others; first, because
refusals to pay do not injure the "responding" member more than the others
(its own contribution is not raised in proportion to the nonpayment);7' and
second, because its own withholding does not operate solely in relation to
the defaulting member but affects the Organization as a whole.
On the other hand, if a member state's refusal to pay is considered a
,material breach" of the Charter and is therefore subject to the provisions
of Article 60(2), the alternatives are twofold. First, if we consider the Charter
to be an unqualified multilateral treaty within the meaning of Article 60(2)(b),
withholding is impermissible because the potential withholder is not "a party
specially affected" for the same reason that was mentioned above. Second,
if we believe that the Charter is "of such a character that a material breach
of its provision by one party radically changes the position of every party
with respect to the further performance of its obligation under the treaty"
(Article 60(2)(c)),7" withholding is still illegitimate since refusals to pay have
never led to a reassessment or a change in the scale that determines member
states' contributions.7" As a result, withholding as a possible response to
breaches of the Charter by one member state is never lawful. But does the
same conclusion apply when the breaches are attributable not to one member
considered ut singuli, but to a group of states ut pluri, i.e., when they act
together as the majority of the Organization?
This problem is extremely complex because, regardless of the type of
multilateral treaty involved, Article 60(2) only deals with breaches "by one
of the parties" and is mute on the possible responses against breaches of the
constituent instrument of an international organization by the collective
will of member states acting as a majority. This silence is disquieting because
alleged fiscal irresponsibility or ultra vires acts always originate in decisions
attributable to the majority, i.e., in acts in which the individual will of each
member fades away and is incorporated in the general will of the Organi-
zation.
In 1957 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice analyzed in depth for the International
Law Commission the various possible consequences of breaches of multilat-
eral treaties.74 His analysis made clear that these consequences are different
for different types of treaties. He did not, however, contemplate the problem
of constituent instruments of international organizations. In 1963 Sir
Humphrey Waldock proposed a text to the Commission that read as follows:
In the case of a material breach of a treaty which is the constituent
instrument of an international organization, . . . any question of the
7' There is no item in the UN budget covering defaults in payment, and when there are gaps
because of refusal to pay, the United Nations is compelled to solicit funds elsewhere.
7 The concept of "interdependent treaty" is also embodied in Article 41(1)(b)(ii) of the
Vienna Convention, supra note 21, the effect of which is to preclude some parties to a multilateral
treaty from modifying it by an agreement inter se where the modification in question is not
prohibited by the treaty.
7s See H. SCHERMERS, supra note 14, at 475-89, §§848-73.
71 Second Report on the Law of Treaties by G. Fitzmaurice, UN Doc. A/CN.4/107 (1957),
reprinted in [1957] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 16, 31 (Art. 19), and 54-55 (commentary), UN
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add. 1.
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termination or suspension of the rights or obligations of any party to
the treaty shall be determined by decision of the competent organ of
the organization concerned, in accordance with its applicable voting
rules. 5
The last seven words of this draft article and the commentary annexed to
it7 ' clearly indicate that the article was addressed to default in its obligations
by one member. The special rapporteur did not believe" there was a need
for detailed consideration of constituent instruments of international or-
ganizations when dealing with the consequences of a fundamental breach,
since it had not yet been decided whether the Convention on the Law of
Treaties would apply to such instruments. It was finally decided that the
Vienna Convention would apply to the constituent instruments of interna-
tional organizations, but the language of Article 60(2) was not amended
accordingly. That provision has never concerned breaches other than "by
one of the parties."
The silence of the Vienna Convention on collective breaches of the con-
stituent instrument by the majority of the organization probably does not
mean that such breaches are inconceivable because, asJeanJacques Rousseau
once declared in an oft-quoted phrase: "The general will is always right and
ever tends to the public advantage. '7 8 Rousseau himself acknowledged that
coteries and cliques may capture the true expression of the general will. He
indicated that "when one of these groups becomes so large as to swamp all
the others. . . the prevailing opinion has no more validity than that of an
individual man." 7
9
The silence of the Vienna Convention on violations of a multilateral treaty
by states acting as the majority of an international organization seems to
mean that the consequences of such violations are simply not covered by
Article 60(2). Under treaty law, withholding to remedy alleged breaches of
the Charter by the General Assembly is therefore impermissible. Such with-
holding does not fall within the possibilities contemplated by Article 60(2).
This conclusion logically conforms with the institutional framework of the
United Nations because the relations between the Organization and its
members, unlike the relations between member states inter se, cannot be
governed by treaty law.
True, the law of treaties may apply to a relationship between the Or-
ganization and a member state, but only insofar as this relationship takes
place outside the institutional structure of the Organization and does not
affect it. For example, the International Court characterized the mandate
between South Africa and the League of Nations as follows: "The Mandate,
" Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, UN Doc. A/CN.4/
156 and Adds. 1-3 (1963), reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 36, 73, UN Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add. 1.7 Id. at 77, para. 19.
77 [1963] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 122, para. 2, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963.
78 THE SOCIAL CONTRAar: ESSAYS BY LocKF, HUME AND RoussEAu 193 (intr. E. Barker
1947).79 Id. at 194.
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in fact and in law, is an international agreement having the character of a
treaty or convention."8 As a result, in 1971 the Court correctly referred
to, if not applied, the rules laid down by the Vienna Convention, and in
particular Article 60, to the relationship between South Africa and the Or-
ganization."' Furthermore, treaty law as codified in the Vienna Convention
has been viewed as appropriate, save some minor adjustments, for application
as a whole to treaties between states and international organizations.8 2
Within the institutional structure of the United Nations, however, member
states are not in a contractual position vis-A-vis the Organization. Each of
them respectively maintains a relationship with the Organization that is not
conventional, but rather institutional or constitutional in substance. As the
Court indicated in the Reparation opinion, "The Charter. . . has defined
the position of the Members in relation to the Organization by requiring
them to give it every assistance in any action undertaken by it (Article 2,
para. 5).""83 The Court made clear that this position is not contractual by
adding that "the Organization . . . occupies a position in certain respects
in detachment from its Members."8 4 This language is not that of the law of
contracts.
In truth, the Organization is a subject of international law endowed with
an international legal personality of its own. That is why the Organization
is not a contracting party to its constituent instrument or even a third party
to it.85 As a result, the Vienna Convention, which has a bearing solely on
states, cannot regulate the relations between the Organization and its mem-
bers in the same manner that it regulates the relations among member states.
Similar reasoning may actually be applied to the relations between a state
and its citizens. Such relations are not regulated by the law of contracts even
though the state originated in a social contract. A member state in its relations
with the Organization is therefore precluded from resorting to a treaty law
remedy (i.e., suspension in part of the treaty such as withholding) as long as
the substance of the rules applicable to their relations is not that of treaty
law. These rules are autonomous; they have characteristics of their own and
are part of what is usually referred to as "international institutional law." 6
The foregoing analysis should not be construed as ruling out any possibility
of finding remedies for violations of the Charter by an organ of the Or-
" South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, 1962
ICJ REP. 319, 330 (Judgment of Dec. 21).
"' Namibia, supra note 58, 1971 ICJ REP. at 47, paras. 94-95.
F
2 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Or-
ganizations or Between International Organizations, done Mar. 21, 1986, UN Doc. A/
CONF. 129/15, reprinted in 25 ILM 543 (1986).
" Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ REP. 174,
178 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Reparation].
" Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
'5 See P. REUTER, supra note 70, at 96, para. 167.
16 With respect to the diversity that exists among international organizations, the substance
of "international institutional law" is probably not especially homogeneous. While aware of
this problem, Henry G. Schermers nevertheless asserts:
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ganization. But such remedies, if any, are not those provided by the Vienna
Convention for violations of multilateral treaties.
III. WITHHOLDING AS A RESPONSE TO CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
Whereas member states usually justify withholding their contributions to
the UN budget on the ground of violations of the Charter by an organ of
the Organization, the United States was the first to withhold part of its
contribution on grounds directly linked to the clause rebus sic stanlibus. Al-
though this doctrine has never been expressly invoked on Capitol Hill,87 the
Kassebaum amendment was mainly designed to cope with the new circum-
stances that now prevail in the United Nations. Allegations of violations of
the Charter by the Organization have been made, but backstage more than
in the limelight.
According to Congressmen Mica and Solomon, "The fundamental goal
of the Kassebaum/Solomon Amendment is the establishment of UN agency
decision-making procedures that would assure a more proportionate influ-
ence on the part of the major donors with respect to budgetary matters." 8 8
More precisely, the amendment aims at giving a greater say in budgetary
matters to the United States, which since the early 1970s has been consistently
outvoted by nations whose combined contributions do not exceed 2 percent
of the total UN budget.
Admittedly, many things have changed at the United Nations since its
inception. 9 It could be said that the UN system was "radically transformed"
as early as 1948, when the emerging Cold War put an end to the political
consensus among the Allied powers-a principal underpinning of the UN
machinery for the maintenance of international peace and security. Other
fundamental changes include the adoption in 1950 of the "Uniting for
Peace" Resolution by the General Assembly,9" the 1965 alteration of the
principle of collective financial responsibility,9 and the Third World's cap-
[A]II public international organizations have much in common.. .. Definitions in con-
stitutional and procedural matters used by one organization will often be adopted by
others..
...Most of the general constitutional problems which the organization.,; meet outside
their technical fields of operation are comparable and the solution found by one can often
be fruitful for others....
• .. It seems-useful, therefore, to make a systematic study of the institutional problems
which arise or may arise in all or most international organizations. The branch of law
concentrating on such problems may be called "international institutional a".
H. SCHERMERS, supra note 14, at 1-2, §§1-2.
s' See, in particular, 1983 House Hearings, supra note 10, and 1985 House Hearings, supra note
25, passim.
"
8 See 1985 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 101.
"See The United States and the United Nations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-332 (1975).
" GA Res. 377 (V), 5 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, UN Doc. A/1775 (1950).
91 See REPERTORY OF PRAcTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS Supp. (No. 3), vol. 1 at 371-
81, especially paras. 61-65 (Art. 17(2)), and 396-99, especially paras. 15-19 and 22 (Art. 19)
(UN Pub. No. E.72.V.2, 1972).
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ture of a majority in the General Assembly in the late 1960s. In the present
situation, save for the Security Council, the most important UN founding
members have lost control over their own creation. Furthermore, this sit-
uation may worsen with the admission of smaller and smaller, and poorer
and poorer states. In that respect, it is not surprising that the USSR agrees
strongly, if privately, with the United States complaint about the current
fiscal irresponsibility of the General Assembly.
To date, the possible application of the theory of fundamental change of
circumstances to constituent instruments of international organizations, and
in particular to the UN Charter, has not been considered in depth. Yet
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,9 2 which the
Court considered as having codified "existing customary law on the subject"
of fundamental change of circumstances,9 3 may govern the relations between
the Organization as a whole and each member state.94 For in contrast with
Article 60(2), which refers to "a breach by one of the parties," Article 62
refrains from setting forth a definite condition with respect to the origin of
the right to suspend the treaty. Article 62 addresses the change of circum-
stances as an objective fact "which has occurred with regard to [the circum-
stances] existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty"-a distinction
of great importance with respect to the UN Charter. It means that a fun-
damental change in the functioning of the Organization may be alleged
without regard to whether the change is attributable to a member state (e.g.,
the abuse of the veto right), a group of states (e.g., refusal by some members
to pay for the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force [UNEF]
and ONUC) or the Organization as a whole (e.g., expulsion of a member in
violation of Article 6 of the Charter). Under such circumstances, there is
little doubt that Article 62 pertains to international institutional law and
12 Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 21, provides:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties,
may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of
the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be
performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for ter-
minating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either
of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any
other party to the treaty.
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of
circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke
the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.
Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, 1973 ICJ REP. 3, 18, para.
36 (Judgment of Feb. 2).
" For similar views, see H. SCHRMERS, supra note 14, at 71, §105(a)(5).
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may be taken into consideration when discussing the legality of withholding
as a response to fundamental changes in the operation of the Organization.
This question gives rise to another: the permissible measures that con-
tracting parties to a treaty may take following a fundamental change of
circumstances. With regard to multilateral treaties, Article 62(1) of the
Vienna Convention mainly offers only one option to a contracting party
affected by a change in conditions: to withdraw from the treaty." Article
62(3) subsidiarily provides that such a party may also choose to suspend the
operation of the treaty between itself and the other contracting parties. In
that case, however, the treaty would generally have to be suspended in whole,
not in part. This conclusion derives from the legislative history of Article
62(3) and from related provisions of the Vienna Convention as well.
The ILC draft article (Article 59)96 on fundamental change of circum-
stances did not foresee the possibility of suspending the operation of the
treaty in the event of a change; it envisaged withdrawal as the sole option.
The Commission had considered the alternative of suspension in such a case
but finally rejected it on the ground that to allow it would amount to ad-
mitting that the change of circumstances need not be fundamental.97 Finland
revived the notion at the Vienna Conference by introducing an amendment98
to add to the ILC draft the option of "suspending the operation of [the]
treaty in whole or in part." Finland subsequently withdrew the words "in..
whole or in part"99 after Sir Humphrey Waldock pointed out that the un-
ambiguous intention of the Commission was to subject the draft article on
fundamental change of circumstances to the draft article on the separability
of treaty provisions.100
Separability of treaty provisions thus applies in case of a fundamental
change of circumstances. Accordingly, a change in conditions that affects
only a particular set of provisions of an agreement entitles a contracting
party to suspend in part the operation of the treaty in its relations with the
other parties. The option of selective suspension does not, however, authorize
"pick-and-choose" remedies; it must be carried out within the limits set
forth by Article 44(3) of the Vienna Convention, I"" that is, it may be invoked
only with respect to the separable provisions affected by the change. In
particular, Article 44(3) clearly provides that the principle of separability
may operate solely with respect to those clauses where:
" See Draft articles, supra note 34, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. ColIM'N at 259, para. 9.
96 VIENNA DOCUMENTS, supra note 34, at 183, para. 538. See also Draft articles, supra note
34, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 256-60.
97 See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, OFFICIAL RECORDS, FIRST
SESSION 381, para. 29, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/11 (1969) (statement made by Sir Humphrey
Waldock, May 11, 1968) [hereinafter VIENNA FIRST SESSION].
98 UN Doc. A/CONF.39/C.1/L.333 (1968), in VIENNA DOCUMENTS, supra note 34, at 183,
184, para. 540.
99 See VIENNA FiRsT SESSION, supra note 97, at 382, para. 35. See also id. at 3139, para. 29.
... See id. at 381, para. 30.
10- See, in particular, Capotorti, L'extinction et la suspension des traits, 134 RECUEIL DES COURS
417, 548 (1971 III).
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(a) the said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty
with regard to their application;
(b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that ac-
ceptance of those clauses was not an essential basis of the consent of
the other party or parties to be bound by the treaty as a whole; and
(c) continued performance of the remainder of the treaty would not
be unjust.10 2
Since "these three conditions are cumulative,"' 0 3 the principle of the integrity
of the treaty overwhelmingly prevails in case of a fundamental change of
circumstances.
When applied to the UN Charter, these considerations mean that unilat-
eral suspension of Article 17(2) is permissible only if the three conditions
laid down in Article 44(3) are cumulatively met. In the first place, it must
be proved that UN financial clauses are separable from the remainder of
the Charter. But one wonders how the Organization can continue to perform
its functions if members withhold their contributions. There are "true ex-
penses, which the Organization has no choice but to incur in order to carry
out a duty, and an essential function which it is bound to perform."'0 4 Ad-
mittedly, selective withholdings, as distinguished from across-the-board ones,
could meet this first prerequisite. Nevertheless, it must also be proved that
the financial provisions were not an essential basis of the consent of the other
members. In that respect, many poor countries could cogently argue that
they entered the Organization because their own financial obligations were
to be minimal, on the understanding that the expenses would be mainly
borne by the wealthiest states in the international community. They could
persuasively claim that in view of their poverty, they would have forgone
admission to the United Nations, had they known that major contributors
would not live up to their financial commitments. Finally, all members that
do not withhold could complain that continued performance of their own
obligations is bound to become unjust because the General Assembly will
be forced in the long run to compensate for withholdings by reassessing and
raising the level of contributions.
The foregoing analysis compels us to conclude that selective and a fortiori
general withholding can scarcely bejustified under the theory of fundamental
change of circumstances as laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. In fact, application of the spirit of Article 62 to the Charter
leads to the conclusion that an alleged fundamental change of circumstances
leaves UN member states with only two options: to accept the new circum-
stances or to withdraw from the Organization.
If we return to the starting point of this essay, we now see that under the
law of treaties the ultimate conclusion holds little promise for the rights of
the minority. Indeed, the minority's sole means of countering the "corporate
102 Art. 44(3), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21.
I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 166 (1984).
104 Certain Expenses, supra note 19, 1962 ICJ REP. at 213 (Fitzmaurice, J., sep. op.).
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will" of the Organization is withdrawal.' 0 5 Treaty law as codified in the
Vienna Convention does not permit suspensions in part of Charter provisions
through such actions as withholding. Such countermeasures are never le-
gitimate remedies in treaty law to the "tyranny of the majority," no matter
what forms this tyranny may take and what the source of the right to suspend
the treaty (in particular, violations of the Charter or fundamental change
of circumstances) may be.
This conclusion, however, is not all that the law has to say on the subject
of withholding. It would not make political or common sense if the majority
could always tell the minority to "take it or leave it." The minority would
be forced into an unfair and enfeebled position. Furthermore, without a
mechanism to protect the rights of the minority, the Organization would
cease to be an "effective multilateral system."' 0 6
IV. THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS
Treaty law as codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention is an important,
but incomplete, source of the law that applies to the United Nations. UN
law is in the first place a particular exemplification of international institu-
tional law, i.e., that branch of international law that applies to international
organizations. True, institutional law draws on the law of treaties in many
respects; but it cannot be identical in its entirety to the law of treaties between
states, which is the exclusive subject of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The
Organization is endowed with international legal personality, which would
be obliterated if the UN legal order were equated with, and reduced to, the
law of treaties between states. The Organization would be split into as many
components as it has members, and the concept of international solidarity-
the quintessence of international institutions-would eventually be jeop-
ardized. In addition, treaty law is far from providing solutions to'all the
problems arising within the Organization. Consequently, institutional law
has been and must be supplemented with "established practices" or "rules"
tailored to the needs of the system. In particular, no matter what treaty law
prescribes with regard to the withholding of contributions, the facts speak
for themselves.
The record of over 30 years reveals ample evidence that member states
have occasionally, but consistently, rejected automatic compliance with the
"corporate will" of the Organization as determined by the majority. In with-
holding part of their contributions, the Soviet Union, France and now the
United States, i.e., the most influential founding members, have not estab-
lished a practice or adopted a practice followed by other member states.
15 It must be borne in mind that, despite the absence of any withdrawal provision in the
Charter, the San Francisco Conference eventually agreed that a member state must be free in
the last resort, "because of exceptional circumstances," to withdraw from the Organization.
See Docs. 1210, 1179 (1) and 1178 (2), 1 UNCIO Docs. 612, 619-20; 6 id. at 2,45, 249; and 7
id. at 324, 327-29, respectively (1945).
"'8 Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UN Dcc. A/41/1, at
3 (1986).
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Precedent has not really been a determinative factor in the decision to with-
hold. Withholders, and especially the United States,' 7 acted in the knowledge
that they should abstain from withholding, but in the belief that they were
obliged to do so in the circumstances. Since bad faith cannot be presumed,1
08
we must assume that contributions are never withheld by any member state
without "compelling reasons," to use Ambassador Goldberg's formulation." 9
As the United States representative never elaborated on them, suffice it to
recall the self-evident truth stated in 1962 by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice:
[F]or if the Assembly had the power automatically to validate any ex-
penditure, ... this would mean that, merely by deciding to spend
money, the Assembly could, in practice, do almost anything, even
something wholly outside its functions, or maybe those of the Organi-
zation as a whole. Member States would be bound to contribute, and
accordingly a degree of power, if not unlimited, certainly much greater
than was ever contemplated in the framing of the Charter, would be
placed in the hands of the Assembly.'"
Thus, the withholding of assessed payments is in regard to budgetary
decisions what reservations to resolutions are in regard to lawmaking by the
General Assembly. The system cannot reject them without repudiating itself.
AsJudge Andr6 Gros asserted in the Namibia opinion: "For if a minority of
States which are not in agreement with a proposed decision are to be bound,
however they vote, and whatever their reservations may be, the General
Assembly would be a federal parliament." " This is not the place to discuss
the controversial statement made by the Court in the Nicaragua case on "the
effect of consent to the text" of certain General Assembly resolutions.'
1 2
The Court never said, however, that reservations to such instruments had
ceased to be legally meaningful.
The truth is that withholding, like reservations, has been "necessitated
through the need""' to keep the Organization from turning into "a super-
State." 4 Absent an impartial third body to give conclusive rulings on such
possible deviations,' 5 the power to withhold payment is a necessary and
proper power of each member state. That power is necessarily implied by
0 7 See the interesting statement made byJeaneJ. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations: "I do not suggest the United States should take lightly the obligation
to pay its assessed share of the budget. This is a serious, but not, in my opinion, an absolute
obligation." 1983 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 54 (Statement of Oct. 3).
'0, In the Tacna-Arica Question (Chile v. Peru), President Coolidge held: "A finding of the
existence of bad faith should be supported not by disputable inferences but by clear and con-
vincing evidence which compels such a conclusion." 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 921, 930 (1925).
'
0 9 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
10 Certain Expenses, supra note 19, 1962 ICJ REP. at 203 (Fitzmaurice,J., sep. op.).
m 1971 ICJ REP. at 334 (GrosJ., dissenting).
112 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits,
1986 ICJ REP. 14, 100, para. 188 (Judgment of June 27).
"13 This language is found in the translation of the dissenting opinion of Judge Gros in the
Namibia opinion, supra note 58, 1971 ICJ REP. at 334. The French reads as follows: "rendue
n~cessaire par la ncessit6."
11' Reparation, supra note 83, 1949 ICJ REP. at 179.
115 For such proposals, see, e.g., Sohn, Due Process in the United Nations, 69 AJIL 620 (1975).
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the legal order of the Organization because its rejection would be to verti-
calize a system that was meant to be, and to remain, horizontal." 6 In short,
the power to withhold is an inherent right of UN membership. To be sure,
that power is not equally shared by all UN members. Major contributors
obviously are not in the same position as those states responsible for only
0.01 percent of the budget. As a matter of law, however, this discrepancy
does not prejudice the right to withhold. Many rights are not equally dis-
tributed among states, chief among them the inherent right of self-defense.
Nobody has ever claimed that such factual inequalities could affect the legal
basis of these rights.
Not surprisingly, regulation of the power to withhold is a much more
intricate problem than its justification or attribution because international
law usually devotes more attention to the attribution than to the regulation
of states'jurisdiction."T Nevertheless, no right of a state can be conclusively
regulated unless its legal basis has been properly asserted. In particular, if
the power to withhold derives from, and is necessarily implied by, the UN
legal order, the reasons for withholding cannot be left to unfettered discre-
tion. They must be "compelling,""' but "compelling" in the legal order of
the Organization. Thus, it is not legal to exercise a "necessary'" power for
reasons of political expediency.
Obviously, the UN legal order cannot have conferred upon members an
indefinite and practically unlimited power of discretion in their exercise of
the right to withhold. The reason is that the power to withhold i,3 a necessary
power. The word "necessary" is the decisive controlling qualification in the
same way that it is the decisive controlling qualification of the implied powers
of the Organization. All implied powers derive from the various undertakings
assumed by the members. In the Reparation opinion, the Court stated: "It
must be noted that the effective working of the Organization. . .require[s]
that these undertakings should be strictly observed.""' 9 An implied power
can therefore be exercised only when it is indispensable to ensuring strict
observance of these undertakings, i.e., to carrying out the original intent of
the Charter. Accordingly, it is doubtful that a member state has "the right
to withhold assessments for U.N. activities which, in [its] opinion, do not
serve [its] national purpose."' 20 The original intent of the Charter was not
.. See Combacau, Le Droit international: bric-d-brac ou systMe?, 31 ARCHIVES DI: PHILOSOPHIE
DU DROIT 85, 90 (1986).
"
7 See Bourquin, Rfgles ginirales du droit de la paix, 35 RECUEIL DES COURS 101 (1931 I).
"s See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
19 1949 ICJ REP. at 183.
"' This language is that of the so-called Goldberg corollary, explained byJeaneJ. Kirkpatrick
as follows:
Justice Goldberg, in response to a recent inquiry from me-at the time, the Law of the
Sea Preparatory Conference [Commission] was under consideration-wrote that it was
his considered conclusion that:
. . . there can be no question that under the Goldberg Reservation the U.S. reserves
the right to withhold assessments for U.N. activities which, in our opinion, do not serve
our national purpose.
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to establish an organization that would serve each member's national interest,
nor was it to afford a group of states with leeway for enhancing prevailing
but biased positions.
The foregoing analysis reveals, without serious question, that the Kasse-
baum amendment is not compatible with the original intent of the Charter,
which was to establish an organization based upon "the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members" (Article 2(1) of the Charter). Even
though the amendment calls for weighted voting only on budgetary matters,
the principle "one state, one vote" inheres in the original intent of the
Charter-so much so that weighted voting could not be applied in the As-
sembly without a revision of the Charter. Article 18(2) of the Charter ex-
pressly provides that "decisions" on "budgetary questions" "shall be made
by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting." This language
even precludes adoption of the budget by consensus. Consensus can only be
used in the organs that make budgetary recommendations to the Assembly.
But this is already the custom in the Committee for Programme and Co-
ordination. As a result, absent revision of the Charter, the only way that the
Organization can fulfill the U.S. demand is by normalizing the practice of
decision making by consensus in the committees that initially rule on the
budget.
The UN membership actually chose the latter course on December 19,
1986, when it adopted Resolution 41/213 on the Review of the Efficiency
of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations. 12 1
The operative part of this resolution (adopted without a vote) provides in
particular:
The General Assembly,
5. Reaffirms that the decision-making process is governed by the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of pro-
cedure of the General Assembly;
6. Agrees that, without prejudice to paragraph 5 above, the Com-
mittee for Programme and Co-ordination should continue its existing
practice of reaching decisions by consensus; explanatory views, if any,
shall be presented to the General Assembly;
7. Considers it desirable that the Fifth Committee, before submitting
its recommendations on the outline of the programme budget to the
I may say that is a Goldberg corollary, not a Kirkpatrick corollary.
1983 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 55 (Statement of Oct. 3).
"21 Resolution 41/213 mainly endorses recommendations made by an intergovernmental
committee of experts (the Group of 18) that was created by Resolution 40/237 and has submitted
71 recommendations to improve the administrative and financial functioning of the Organization.
See Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of
the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations, 41 UN GAOR Supp.
(No. 49), UN Doc. A/41/49 (1986). Both Resolution 41/213 and the report are reprinted in
26 ILM 138, 145 (1987).
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General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Charter
and the rules of procedure of the Assembly, should continue to make
all possible efforts with a view to establishing the broadest possible
agreement. 12
2
It may well be that the United Nations has done "quite a fine job in
meeting the intent" 123 of the Kassebaum amendment. Its basic demand,
however, has not been fulfilled. The principle "one state, one vote" remains
unchanged in budgetary matters. Moreover, Resolution 41/213 is supple-
mented by an important annex: a statement made by the President of the
General Assembly on December 19, 1986.124 This statement reproduces
the opinion of the UN Legal Counsel on the effect that the three paragraphs
quoted above will have on the UN budgetary process.12 - It reads as follows:
"[T]hese. . .paragraphs read separately or together do not in any way
prejudice the provisions of Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations
or of the relevant rules of procedure of the General Assembly giving effect
to that Article." Furthermore, these paragraphs cannot be read without
referring to Annex II because appended to each of them is a footnote that
directs the reader to "[s]ee annex II to the present resolution." In short,
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of Resolution 41/213 are not separable from the
opinion of the Legal Counsel. Thus, the whole "new" system rests, as it
were, on a gentlemen's agreement among all the members of the Organi-
zation. They have all tacitly agreed that decisions on budgetary matters will
not be taken against the will of the major contributors; but UN budgetary
law has not been changed.
At any rate, the 1986 budgetary arrangement is without prejudice to the
right to withhold contributions within the limits previously defined. Whether
or not this right will be exercised in the future by major contributors remains
an open question.
In conclusion, it is just as wrong to believe that the minority must always
yield to the "corporate will" of the Organization as determined by the ma-
jority as to believe that the minority may freely impose its own interests
through financial blackmail. The power to withhold is not a freedom, but
an inherent right of members to remind the Organization, if need be, of
certain obligations. It is certainly legitimate to consider introducing proce-
dures such as judicial remedies that would make this power unnecessary.
But two final remarks must be made in that regard. On the one hand, the
adoption of such procedures would necessarily result in amending the
Charter, and the legal order of the Organization would be transformed. On
the other, the present-day ideological divisions in the international com-
munity make proposals for such procedures unrealistic and probably unwise.
122 Footnotes omitted.
123 Statement of Sen. Nancy L. Kassebaum, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1987, at A27, col. 1. See
also N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1987, at Al, cols. 4, 5.
124 Statement made by the President of the General Assembly at the 102d plenary meeting,
Ann. II to GA Res. 41/213, supra note 121.
Us The legal opinion may also be found in UN Doc. A/41/PV.102, at 7-8 (1986).
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